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Abstract The ForMaRE project applies formal mathematical reasoning
to economics. We seek to increase confidence in economics’ theoretical
results, to aid in discovering new results, and to foster interest in formal
methods, i.e. computer-aided reasoning, within economics. To formal
methods, we seek to contribute user experience feedback from new audi-
ences, as well as new challenge problems. In the first project year, we con-
tinued earlier game theory studies but then focused on auctions, where
we are building a toolbox of formalisations, and have started to study
matching and financial risk. In parallel to conducting research that con-
nects economics and formal methods, we organise events and provide
infrastructure to connect both communities, from fostering mutual aware-
ness to targeted matchmaking. These efforts extend beyond economics,
towards generally enabling domain experts to use mechanised reasoning.
1 Motivation of the ForMaRE Project
The ForMaRE project applies formal mathematical reasoning to economics. The-
oretical economics draws on a wide range of mathematics to explore and prove
properties of stylised economic environments. Mathematical formalisation and
computer-aided reasoning have been applied there before, most prominently to
social choice theory (cf., e.g., [3]) and game theory (cf., e.g., [15]). Immediately
preceding ForMaRE, we have ourselves formalised pillage games, a particular
form of cooperative games, and motivated this as follows at CICM 2011 [6]:
1. Economics, and particularly cooperative game theory, is a relatively new area
for mechanised reasoning (still in 2013) and therefore presents a new set of ca-
nonical examples and challenge problems. 2. Economics typically involves new
mathematics in that axioms particular to economics are postulated. One of the
intriguing aspects of cooperative game theory is that, while the mathematical
concepts involved are often intelligible to even undergraduate mathematicians,
general theories are elusive. This has made pillage games more amenable to
formalisation than research level mathematics. 3. In economics, as in any other
mathematical discipline, establishing new results is an error-prone process, even
⋆ This work has been supported by EPSRC grant EP/J007498/1. The final publication
is available at http://link.springer.com.
for Nobel laureates (cf. [6] for concrete examples). As one easily assumes false
theorems or overlooks cases in proofs, formalisation and automated validation
may increase confidence in results. Knowledge management facilities provided
by mechanised reasoning systems may additionally help to reuse proof efforts
and to explore theories to discover new results. Despite these potential benefits,
economics has so far been formalised almost exclusively by computer scientists,
not by economists.
2 The ForMaRE Strategy
The ForMaRE project, kicked off by the authors in May 2012 and further advised
by more than a dozen of external computer scientist and economist collaborators,
seeks to foster interest in formal methods within economics. Our strategy consists
in using this technology to establish new results, building trust in formalisation
technology and enabling economists to use it themselves.
2.1 Establishing New Results
In preparing one of our first activities, an overview of mechanised reasoning
for economists (cf. sec. 3.1), we realised that exciting work was being done in
areas with broader audiences than cooperative games. We therefore chose to
study auctions, matching markets and financial risk. We have not yet established
new results but have defined first research goals with experts in these fields,
some of whose works we cite in the following: auctions are widely used for
allocating goods and services. Novel auctions are constantly being designed –
e.g. for allocating new top-level Internet domains [1] – but their complexity
makes it difficult to establish basic properties, including their efficiency i.e. give
a domain to the registrar who values it highest and is therefore expected to
utilise it best. Matching problems occur, e.g., in health care (matching kidney
donors to patients) and in education (children to schools) [14]. Impossibility
results are of particular interest here; they rely on finding rich counter examples.
Finally, modern finance relies on models to price assets or to compute risk, but
banks and regulators still validate and check such models manually. One research
challenge is to develop minimal test portfolios that ensure that capital models
incorporate relevant risk factors [16].
2.2 Building Trust in Formalisation Technology
Economic theorists typically have a solid mathematics background. There is a
field ‘computational economics’; however, it is mainly concerned with numerical
computation of solutions or simulations [4]. Contemporary economists still prove
their theorems using pen and paper. While we aim at establishing new results to
showcase the potential of formal methods (see above), we also seek to establish
confidence in formal methods within the economics community. Thus, as a first
step, we have demonstrated the reliability of formal methods by re-establishing
known results. Computer scientists have previously done so by formalising some
of the many known proofs of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, a central result of
social choice theory [13, 18]. We have started to formalise the review of an influ-
ential auction theory textbook [12] in four theorem proving systems in parallel,
collaborating with their developers or expert users [10]. This formalisation, cur-
rently covering Vickrey’s theorem on second price auctions, constitutes the core
of an Auction Theory Toolbox (ATT [11]). The review covers 12 more canon-
ical results for single good auctions. We plan to extend the ATT, including new
auction designs as well, and welcome contributions from the community.
2.3 Enabling Economists to use Mechanised Reasoning
Ultimately we aim at enabling economists to formalise their own designs and val-
idate them themselves, or at least to train specialists beyond the core mechanised
reasoning community, who will assist economists with formalisation – just like
lawyers assist with legal issues. For users without a strong mechanised reasoning
background the complexity and abundance of formalised languages and proof as-
sistants poses an adoption barrier. In selected fields, we will provide toolboxes of
ready-to-use formalisations of basic concepts, including definitions and essential
properties, and guides to extending and applying these toolboxes. Concretely,
this means: 1. identifying languages that are (a) sufficiently expressive while
still exhibiting efficient reasoning tasks, that are (b) learnable for people used
to informal textbook notation, and that (c) have rich libraries of mathematical
foundations, and 2. identifying proof assistants that (a) assist with formalisation
in a cost-effective way, (b) facilitate reuse from the toolbox, (c) whose output
is sufficiently comprehensible to help non-experts understand, e.g., why a proof
attempt failed, and (d) whose community is supportive towards non-experts. In
building the ATT, we are comparing four different systems, whose philosophies
cover a large subset of the spectrum: Isabelle (interactive theorem prover, HOL,
accessible via a document-oriented IDE), CASL/Hets (uniform GUI frontend to
a wide range of automated FOL provers), Theorema (automated but configurable
theorem prover, HOL with custom FOL and set theory inference rules, Mathem-
atica notebook interface with a textbook-like notation), and Mizar (automated
proof checker, FOL plus set theory). For details on these systems and how well
they satisfy the requirements, see [10].
3 Building, Connecting, and Serving Communities
In parallel to our research on connecting economics and formal methods, we are
conducting community building efforts.
3.1 Connecting Computer Science and Economics
With this CICM paper, with an invited lecture at the British Automated Reas-
oning Workshop [5], and an upcoming tutorial at the German annual computer
science meeting themed ‘computer science adapted to humans, organisation and
the environment’ [8], we aim at making developers and users of mechanised
reasoning systems, aware of 1. new, challenging problems in the application do-
main of economics, of 2. new target audiences not having the same background
knowledge about formal languages, logics, etc., and thus of 3. the necessity of
enhancing the usability and documentation of the systems for a wider audience.
Conversely, our message to economists, e.g. in a mechanised reasoning invited
lecture at the 2012 summer school of the Initiative for Computational Econom-
ics (ICE [4]), is that there is a wide range of tools to assist with reliably solving
relevant problems in economics.
3.2 Infrastructure for the Community
With the ForMaRE-discuss@cs.bham.ac.uk mailing list and a project community
site (both linked from our homepage), we furthermore provide infrastructure to
the communities we intend to connect. The main purpose of the community site
is to collect pointers to existing formalisations of theorems, models and theories
in economics [2], inspired by Wiedijk’s list of formalisations of 100 well-known
theorems [17], and to give a home to economics formalisations not published
online otherwise. The site is powered by Planetary [7], a mathematics-aware web
content management system with LATEX input, a format familiar to economists.
3.3 Reaching out to Application Domains Beyond Economics
Finally, we are reaching out to further application domains beyond econom-
ics. At our symposium on enabling domain experts to use formalised reasoning
(Do-Form [9]), economics and its formalisation was a strong showcase, with our
expert collaborators working on auctions, matching and finance giving hands-on
tutorials (cf. sec. 2.1), but we also attracted submissions on domains as diverse as
environmental models and autonomous systems and on tools from controlled nat-
ural language to formal specification. Do-Form has aimed at connecting domain
experts having problems (‘nails’) and computer scientists developing systems
(‘hammers’) from the start of its novel submission and review process, which
involved match-making. We initially invited short hammer and nail descriptions.
We published the accepted submissions with editorial summaries and indications
of possible matches3 online and then called for the second round of submissions:
revisions of the initial submissions (now elaborating on possible matches), regu-
lar research papers or system descriptions, particularly encouraging new authors
to match the initial submissions. This finally resulted in 12 papers.
We believe that such community-building efforts, which originated from For-
MaRE’s goal to apply formal mathematical reasoning in economics, will also help
to achieve closer collaboration within the CICM community4: In future, CICM
3 E.g., we pointed out to the authors of a hammer description that their system might
be applicable to the problem mentioned in some nail description.
4 This was one of the topics discussed in the 2012 MKM trustee election.
attendees and reviewers reading this paper might point us to the best tools for
formalising auctions, matching markets, and financial risk.
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